




















A model of self-feeding fear is presented. Suppose that an economic agent is (1-￿) ×
100% certain that uncertainty she faces is characterized by a particular probability measure,
but that she has a fear that, with ￿ × 100% chance, her conviction is completely wrong and
she is left perfectly ignorant about the true measure in the present as well as in the future.
We call this situation ￿-contamination of confidence. In this situation, if the economic agent
follows Bayesian procedure or its variant, which is considered as rational in the theory of
economics, her confidence erodes after having new observation.
∗The work reported here is partially supported by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Insitute, the
Cabinet Office, the Government of Japan.1
1. Introduction and Summary
Consider a following cheap scenario that may be found in any of TV soap operas. “A
wife of a medical doctor in a wealthy suburb of a big city with a luxurious life style, has
developed a fear, though very small, that her husband may have an ongoing affair with someone
in his clinic. She is still almost sure that it is not true, but this small fear makes her cautious
about her husband’s daily activities. Then, she notices small things that might be overlooked
before: a tiny pinky stain on the collar of his shirt, slightly more than usual late returns home,
and seeming avoidance of her eyes. Although she still wants to believe his fidelity, they seem
to, though rather vaguely, suggest the opposite. Moreover, she is now gradually able to explain
previously overlooked, inexplicable behavior of her husband in the past. Her fear thus grows,
feeding on her fear itself. ...”
The behavior of this wife seems psychopathic, and not a good subject of economics:
after all, economics is a science of rational behavior, not of pathological one. However,
we argue that this kind of behavior may not at all be pathological, but a result of rational
information processing. In particular, we show the following: Suppose that an economic agent
is (1 − ε) × 100% certain that uncertainty she faces is characterized by a particular probability
measure, but that she has a fear that, with ε × 100% chance, her conviction is completely
wrong and she is left perfectly ignorant about the true measure in the present as well as in the
future. We call this situation ε-contamination of confidence. In this situation, if the economic
agent follows Bayesian procedure or its variant, which is considered as rational in the theory of
economics, her confidence erodes after having new observation. Thus confidence erodes and
fear feeds on itself. The reason of confidence erosion is very similar to the example of the
doctor’s wife. New information brings a new possibility which is not previously considered.
In this paper, the ε-cotamination is characterized as an example of Knightian uncertainty.
In contrast to the traditional approach, the Knightian uncertainty approach characterizes uncertainty
as a set of distributions, instead of a single distribution. Hence, learning is characterized by
an update process of the set of distributions after each of random sampling. Among update
rules under Knightian uncertainty, the maximum-likelihood update rule, which is often called
the Dempster-Shafer rule, and a generalized Bayesian update rule, which may be called the2
Fagin-Halpern rule, have attracted much attention since they seem intuitive and sensible.1 After
having new observation, the Dempster-Shafer rule chooses, among all distributions in the set
characterizing Knightian uncertainty, those that put the highest probability on the occurrence
of an actual observation, and updates the chosen distributions by using the Bayes rule (thus
narrowing of the range of probability measures takes place). The Fagin-Halpern rule updates all
distribution in the set by using the Bayes rule and keeps all of them in the set (thus there is no
narrowing). Both rules are based on Bayesian ideas. Since these rules are sensible, one may
expect that by using either or both of these rules, learning reduces Knightian uncertainty, in the
sense that the set of distributions that the decision maker faces “shrinks” after each observation.
However, we show the opposite is the case under ε-contamination. This is surprising particularly
in the case of the Dempster-Shafer rule, in which substantial narrowing seems to occur after
obtaining a new observation through the maximum-likelihood principle.
In fact, there are many anecdotes of self-feeding fear in the real world. In stock
markets, when confidence erodes, fear sometimes seems to feed on itself in bear markets even
though there are no particularly bad news. However, when fear goes away, the market quickly
stages a rally (sometimes a spectacular one) to return to the no-fear level. In currency markets,
if confidence in the will of a country’s authority to defend home currency diminishes, then fear
of depreciation in some cases may feed itself to accelerate depreciation to overshoot. These
phenomena may be a result of rational behavior of economic agents facing ε-contamination of
confidence.
In the statistics literature, Seidenfeld and Wasserman (1993) presented necessary and
sufficient conditions that dilation of uncertainty (which corresponds to an erosion of confidence)
take place in the case of the “no-narrowing” Fagin and Halpern rule. However, these conditions
are hard to explain and thus they are difficult to apply in economic problems of our interest.
The contribution of this paper is, firstly, to present an example that dilation still occurs in the
“range-narrowing” Dempster-Shafer rule, and second and most of all, to show that confidence
erosion or self-feeding fear can happen quite easily if such confidence erosion is ε-contamination.
1In fact, to our knowledge, there is no other update rule that has been discussed as widely and intensively as
these rules in the literature.3
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple example of
self-feeding fear in a model of job search and learning developed by Rothschild (1974). A
general model of self-feeding fear is presented in Sections 3 through 5. In Section 3, we
formulate stochastic environment and the decision maker’s objective function, and define “dilation
of uncertainty”: a situation that “new observation reduces confidence.” Section 4 defines and
examines two “sensible” updating rules: the Dempster-Shafer and Fagin-Halpern rules. Section 5
contains the main results: In the case of ε-contamination, dilation of uncertainty occurs regardless
of whether the Dempster-Shafer rule or the Fagin-Halpern one is utilized.
2. Self-Feeding Fear in Rothschild’s Learning Model
Let us consider a case considered by Rothschild (1974), which has been one of the most
well-known examples in the economics of learning. An unemployed worker is searching for a
job. Different firms offer different wages. She takes a job interview sequentially and gets one
wage quotation each time. To make analysis simple and apparent, we consider a two-period
model.2
In Rothschild’s model, the unemployed worker is risk-neutral, and contemplates her
optimal policy in terms of expected income. She does not know the wage distribution,
and learns about the distribution from the wage observation. In particular, the unemployed
worker assumes that the wage-offer distribution is a multinomial distribution with a support of
W = {w1,...,w k}⊆R. However, she does not know probability pi of a particular wi.
It is then assumed that the unemployed worker thinks that the probability of pi’s is
distributed according to a Dirichlet distribution over a set P,
P =
￿











whose density function is
f(p|α)=









2Rothschild (1974) considers an infinite horizon. We deviate from his work in this respect, in order to make our
argument simple and transparent.4
where α ∈ Rk
++ is a parameter vector and Γ(·) is the gamma function. The mean of each




 =1 α 
. (1)
Suppose that the decision-maker observed a wage offer wi in the first period. Then, by
DeGroot (1970, p.174, Theorem 1), the posterior distribution of wj’s, updated by Bayes’ rule
upon observing wi, turns out to be the Dirichlet distribution with the parameter vector
α =( α1,...,α i−1,α i +1 ,α i+1,...,α k). (2)
The learning process of the unemployed worker has the following interpretation. Suppose
that the agent has a “prior” wage distribution which is multinomial with parameters p0 =
(p0
1,...,p 0
k) over the wage offer in the second period, where for each j, p0
j is a probability
of wj’s occurrence and it is defined by p0
j ≡ E[pj]. Then, from (1), her “prior” second-period
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. (3)
Then, the worker gets the wage offer wi for some i in the first period. Upon observing wi,
she revises her prior distribution, p0, to the posterior one, p =( p￿
1(wi),...,p ￿
k(wi)),w h e r e
p￿
j(wi)=E[pj|wi]. Then, with some calculation3, her “prior” second-period expected income (3)
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j=1 wjαj + wi
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 =1 α  +1
.
The unemployed worker then uses this posterior second-period expected wage income in contem-
plating her optimal strategy: whether to stop searching now or to go on to the next period.
The above example of Rothschild assumes that the unemployed worker is perfectly certain
that the wage distribution is a multinomial one and the distribution of the wage-occurrence
3Letting E[·|wi] be the posterior mean, (1) and the paragraph containing (2) imply that
(∀j  = i) E[pj|wi]=
αj
k




 =1 α  +1
.5
probability is a Dirichlet distribution. However, there is no ap r i o r irationale that the worker
assumes this particular combination.
Let us now deviate from Rothschild’s specification, and consider a case in which the
unemployed worker is almost certain that the true distribution is the multinomial distribution
with the known p0 =( p0
1,...,p 0
k), but that she is not completely certain about that. Thus,
she fears that, with ε × 100% probability, the true distribution is different from this multinomial
distribution, and moreover, she may not have any information about the true parameter values
if p0 is not the true one. Furthermore, she is even uncertain about the “stability” of the
true distribution. She thinks the parameter values may change from the first period to the
second. In other words, the unemployed worker is almost ((1− ε) × 100%) certain about the
wage distribution but has a ε × 100% fear that she is wrong and left completely ignorant about
the true distribution. In this setting, it is natural to call ε as a measure to gauge ignorance, or
equivalently, (1− ε) as the degree of confidence.
Since the unemployed worker is risk-neutral and thus maximizes expected income, her
situation is the same as that of a decision-maker facing the ε-contaminationof the distribution.4
Formally, let ε ∈ (0,1) and let P × P be a set of pairs of p in the first period and p in the
second period5:




￿ p,p ∈ P
￿
.








(1 − ε)(p0,p0)+ε(q,q )
￿ ￿ (q,q ) ∈ P × P
￿
.
Uncertainty which is not reduced to a single distribution and thus represented by a set of
4The concept of ε-contamination defined in this paper is first used in Nishimura and Ozaki (2001) who examine
search behavior under Knightian uncertainty.
5In other words, × is the set of all product measures of the form: ⊗ when we regard and as
probability measures on W. In the text, we denote ⊗ by ( , ).
6In this section’s definition of the ε-contamination, we restrict a contamination, ( , ), to be a product probability
measure. In the formal analysis in the following sections, we allow the contamination to be any probability measure
defined over the product space, which is not necessarily a product measure. See Eq (13) in Section 5.
The ε-contamination has been widely used in statistics literature to specify a set of measures (see, for example,
Berger, 1985). There, the sensitivity of an estimator to the assumed prior distribution ((
0,
0) in the text) is the
main concern in the context of Bayesian estimation problems. While we also specify a set of measures or Knightian
uncertainty by the ε-contamination, our main concern is not such a robustness of a specfic prior or confidence but
the set itself, which reflects the decision-maker’s lack of confidence.6
distributions is called Knightian uncertainty.T h eε-contanination defined above is one example
of Knightian uncertainty.
We now examine what happens to the degree of confidence when new observation
arrives. However, In order to proceed with our analysis, we should specify the decision
maker’s objective function and update procedure of priors in the case of Knightian uncertainty
or multiple probability distributions.
Firstly, it is known (see Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)) that in
multiple-probability cases of this kind, if the decision-maker’s behavior is in accordance with
certain sensible axioms, then her behavior is characterized as being uncertainty-averse:w h e nt h e
decision-maker evaluates her position, she uses probability corresponding to the “worst” scenario.
Following this line of argument, we assume that the unemployed worker is uncertainty-averse.




Let us now consider this updating process. Let (wi,w ￿
j) denote an event that the first-
period wage observation is wi and the second-period one is wj. Then, the probability of this






















And hence, the set of the prior second-period probabilities is given by
￿





Suppose as before that wi is observed. The unemployed worker updates each element






























































¯ ε￿q ∈ P.








Conversely, take one element of (7), (1 −¯ ε￿)p0+¯ ε￿¯ q . Then, it is always possible to find
ε￿ ∈ [0,¯ ε￿] (and ultimately q ∈ P)a n dq ∈ P satisfying that (1 −¯ ε￿)p0+¯ ε￿¯ q =( 1− ε￿)p0+ε￿q
and then qi ∈ [0,1] satisfying (6). Since the set of posterior distributions corresponding to (4) is
characterized by (5) and (6) with q and q varying (see the paragraph containing (5) and (6)),
(7) is a subset of that set. Thus, all things considered, we conclude that the set of posteriors
after wi is observed is equal to (7).
Let us now compare the set of priors (4) and that of posteriors (7). The latter shows
that the unemployed worker is now (1 − ¯ ε￿) × 100% certain about p0: her fear of that her
conviction is wrong now increased from ε to ¯ ε￿ (¯ ε￿ >εas far as p0
i < 1). The decision-maker’s
degree of confidence is decreased after the observation of wi. Note that there is no “surprise”
justifying a decrease in confidence. In other words, the fear of ignorance is feeding itself.
It is clear that dynamic feature of Knightian uncertainty plays a crucial role to obtain
this “self-feeding fear.” Here, Knightian uncertainty is dynamic in the sense that the decision-
maker thinks that the true distribution may change over time. Loosely speaking, the argument8
in the second to the last paragraph reveals that a new observation makes the decision-maker
“find” a combination of probabilities over two periods leading to a posterior probability that is
not considered by her before (probability outside her prior beliefs). To make an analogy of
the soap-opera story of the introduction, an event, which may be benign in a usual setup, may
nevertheless indicate a possibility that has never popped up to the mind of the decision-maker
before. Her rational reasoning in the form of Bayesian updating is ingenious to produce a story
that is inexistent in her minds before this observation is obtained.
In this section, we have presented an example that fear of ignorance is self-feeding: new
information reduces confidence of the decision-maker about uncertain world if her confidence
is ε-contaminated. However, the argument we have employed is heuristic, though intuitive.
Thus, one may question the generality and rigorousness of the result. In the next section,
we reformulate the basic problem of this section in a framework of behavior under dynamic
Knightian uncertainty having behavioral foundation. There are two updating rules commonly
utilized in the literature for this kind of problems. The formal exposition of these updating rules
is given in Section 4. In Section 5, we show that the same results as this section holds true for
general distributions and for both updating rules under ε-contamination: new information reduces
the decision-maker’s confidence.
3. The Two-Period Dynamic Model of Knightian Uncertainty
In order to make a formal analysis, we have to set up a dynamic model in which the
decision-maker have multiple probability measures about her economic environment. In the
following, we first specify stochastic environment and consider an update rule. We then incor-
porate the update rule into the decision-maker’s objective function to represent evolution of her
view of the world in the form of multiple probability measures over stochastic environment. We
exclusively consider a two-period model. An extension to multi-period cases is straightforward
but notationally cumbersome.
In the following, notations are somewhat involved, because of the complexity introduced
by dynamic Knghtian uncertainty: the decision-maker does not have perfect confidence not
only about a “true” probability measure each period but also how it changes over periods.9
Consequently, the model, including the objective function and updating rules, is specified in an
entire dynamic structure of the deicision-maker’s stochastic environment.
Information Structure. Let W be a state space for each single period and let Ω=W × W
be the whole state space. A generic element of Ω is denoted by (w1,w 2).
The information structure, which represents the basis of the decision-maker’s view of the
world, is exogenously given by a filtration F =  Ft t=0,1,2. We assume that F0 = {φ,Ω},t h a t
F1 is represented by a finite partition of Ω of the form:  Ei × W i for some finite partition
 Ei m
i=1 of W,a n dt h a tF2 is represented by a finite partition of Ω of the form:  Ei × Fj i,j
for some finite partition  Fj n
j=1 of W. Clearly, it holds that F0 ⊆F 1 ⊆F 2. We further
assume that m ≥ 2.
We abuse a notation to denote by (W,  Ei i) the measurable space on which the algebra
is generated by the partition  Ei i and we denote the set of all probability measures on it by
M(W, Ei i). Similar notations apply to other cases in obvious manners.
Given p ∈ M(Ω,F2),w ed e n o t eb yp|1 its restriction on (Ω,F1). Although p|1 is
formally a measure on Ω, it can be naturally regarded as the one on (W, Ei i) a n di nt h a t
case, p|1(·)=p(·×W).T h u s v i e w e d , p|1 can be considered as the first-period marginal
probability measure of p. Similarly, we define the second-period marginal probability measure,
p|2,o fp.T h a ti s ,l e tp|2 ∈ M(W, Fj j) be defined by p|2(·)=p(W ×· ).
The decision-maker’s view of the world is represented by not a single probability measure
but a set of probability measures (Knightian uncertainty). Formally, we assume that the decision-
maker’s Knightian uncertainty is represented by P ⊆ M(Ω,F2).
Finally, let us now define “priors.” Given P ⊆ M(Ω,F2),w ed e f i n et h e(prior)
second-period marginal Knightian uncertainty, P|2, as a set of second-period marginal probability
measures such that
P|2 = { p|2 | p ∈ P} .
Here, the adjective prior emphasizes the fact that this is a set of the second-period marginal
probability measures before the decision-maker obtains an observation in the first period.10
Income Process. An income in each period, denoted y1 and y2, is a function from Ω=W ×W
into R. We call (y1,y 2) an income process if it is F-adapted, that is, (∀t) yt is Ft-measurable.
G i v e na ni n c o m ep r o c e s s(y1,y 2), we write the value of y2 as y2|w1∈E,w2∈F if (w1,w 2) ∈ E×F
for some E × F ∈F 2.T h e F-adaptedness allows us to write the value of y1 as y1|w1∈E if
w1 ∈ E for some E such that E × W ∈F 1.W ed e n o t et h es e to fF-adapted income processes
by Y (F).
Updating Rules. Let p be a probability measure on (Ω,F2),t h a ti s ,l e tp ∈ M(Ω,F2).A f t e r
observing Ei in the first period, the decision maker updates her probability measures.
Let us now first consider the ordinary Bayesian updating procedure. Given p and
Ei such that p(Ei × W) > 0,w ed e n o t eb yp|2(·|Ei) the (posterior) probability measure on
(Ω,F2) conditional on the occurrence of Ei × W. Here, the adjective posterior signifies the
fact that this is a probability measure after the decision-maker obtains an observation Ei.T h a t
is, (∀i,j) p|2(Ei × Fj|Ei)=p(Ei × Fj)/p(Ei × W). By writing p|2(·|Ei)=p|2(Ei ×· | Ei),
p|2(·|Ei) may be regarded as a probability measure on (W,  Fj j). (It should be noted here
that p|2(·)=p|2(·|W).) The Bayesian procedure is defined as a function: (p,Ei)  → p|2(·|Ei),
which maps a pair of measure p on (Ω,F2) a n da ne v e n tEi in the first period, to the measure
on (W, Fj j) according to the manner defined in this paragraph.
An updating rule we consider in this paper generalizes the function p|2 in the ordinary
Bayesian procedure to the case of multiple p’s, that is, where there exists Knightian uncertainty.
Formally, an updating rule is a function that maps a pair (P,E),w h e r eP is the decision-maker’s
Knightian uncertainty (a nonempty compact subset of M(Ω,F2))a n dE is an  Ei i-measurable
event such that (∀p ∈ P) p(E ×W) > 0, to a set of (posterior) probability measures, which is a
nonempty compact subset of M(W, Fj j). W ed e n o t ea nu p d a t i n gr u l eb yφ and its specific
value by φ(P,E). (This seemingly cumbersome notation is necessary for taking account of
dynamic Knightian uncertainty, as we will see later in this and following sections.)
There is one natural restriction on sensible updating rules. When P happens to be a
singleton, they should coincide with Bayes’ rule:
φ({p},E)={p|2(·|E)}. (8)11
Objective Function. Let us now turn to the issue of formulating the objective function of the
decision-maker. As in the previous section, we assume that the minimum of the “expected”
life-time income, V , is her objective function to be maximized, which is given by:














 p(Ei × W), (9)
where (y1,y 2) ∈ Y (F), φ is a updating rule, β (> 0) i sad i s c o u n tf a c t o ra n dP is the
decision-maker’s Knightian uncertainty, which is a subset of M(Ω,F2). In order that this
definition is meaningful, P must be a nonempty compact subset of M(Ω,F2) satisfying (∀p ∈
P)(∀i) p(Ei × W) > 0.
Preferences represented by special cases of Eq (9), where the updating rules are further
specified, are axiomatized by Epstein and Schneider (2001) and Wang (2001) (see next section).
Dilation of Knightian Uncertainty. We now define “dilation” of (Knightian) uncertainty. Let
P ∈ M(Ω,F2) be Knightian uncertainty that the decision-maker faces and let φ be her update
rule. The dilation of (Knightian) uncertainty takes place upon the occurrence of E ∈  Ei i if
the set of posterior probability measures generated by the update rule is strictly “greater” than
the set of prior probability measures, or equivalently if it holds that
φ(P,E) ⊃ P|2
where the set-inclusion is strict. In this case, the set of prior probability measures does
not shrink but dilates: the decision-maker faces larger uncertainty than before obtaining the
observation.8
8In the statistics literature, the dilation is defined with respect to lower- and upper-probabilities. To be more
precise, let ⊆ (Ω,F2) and let B ∈F 2 be such that (∀p ∈ ) p(B) > 0. Then, define the lower-probability,
denoted ,b y
(∀A ∈F 2) (A) = inf
p∈
p(A)
and define the conditional lower-probability, denoted (·|B),b y
(∀A ∈F 2) (A|B)=i n f
p∈
p(A ∩ B)/p(B).
The upper-probability and the conditional upper-probability (·|B) are defined symmetrically. Each of these
“probabilities” turns out to be non-additive probability measure, or capacity. It is said that B dilates A if the
following holds:
(A|B) < (A) ≤ (A) < (A|B). (10)12
In contrast, if the opposite strict set-inclusion holds for some E ∈  Ei i,w ed e s c r i b ei t
as the contraction of uncertainty upon the occurrence of E. In this case, the decision maker
faces smaller uncertainty than before obtaining the observation.
4. The Fagin-Halpern and Dempster-Shafer Rules
We consider two updating rules which have been extensively studied in the literature.9
The Fagin-Halpern updating rule (henceforth, the FH rule)10, which is also known as the
generalized Bayes’ rule, is denoted by φFH and is defined by
(∀P ⊆ M(Ω,F2))(∀E ∈  Ei i) φFH(P,E)={p|2(·|E)|p ∈ P}. (11)
This means that the decision-maker updates all probability measures according to the ordinary
Bayesian procedure. In particular, she does not discard any of these measures after the ob-
servation. It is evident that the procedure we employed in Section 2 corresponds to this rule.
When φ is specified by φFH, the decision maker’s objective function becomes















A preference-theoretic foundation of this updating rule is given by Epstein and Schneider
(2001). They axiomatize the preference relation represented by (9) with P being “rectangular”
and φ being the FH rule (see Epstein and Schneider (2001) for details including the concept of
rectangularity).
For this concept of dilation and study of its properties, see Seidenfeld and Wasserman (1993). Herron, Seidenfeld
and Wasserman (1997) contains some additional analysis. Walley (1991) extensively studies the lower- and upper-
probabilities.
Seidenfeld and Wasserman (1993) derives a necessary and sufficient condition for the dilation to take place in the
sense of (10), for cases including the ε-contamination. Their condition, however, is based on a particular event A,
not on set of measures, so that its application to economic models is rather difficult if not impossible.
In Section 5, we derive a sufficient condition for the dilation to take place for the ε-contamination in the sense
defined in the text. Our definition is more general than (10) since it is applied directly to a set of measures, not to
a particular event A. We consider the Dempster-Shafer update rule as well as the Fagin-Halpern update rule (see the
next section) while (10) is related only to the Fagin-Halpern rule. Further, we consider dynamic nature of Knightian
uncertainty explicitly to derive economic intuition behind the dilation.
9See Dempster (1967, 1968); Shafer (1976); Fagin and Halpern (1990); Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993); and
Denneberg (1994).
10The Fagin-Halpern rule is originally proposed as an update rule for a non-additive measure. More precisely, the
rule was developed for which is characterized as the core of a non-additive measure (Fagin and Halpern, 1990;
Denneberg, 1994). The text use of the rule is its natural extension to the case of a more general .13
To define the Dempster-Shafer updating rule (henceforth, the DS rule)11,l e tP∗ be
defined by
(∀E ∈  Ei i) P∗(E) = argmax{ p|1(E)| p ∈ P} .
Then, the DS rule, which is also known as the maximum-likelihood rule, is defined by
(∀P ⊆ M(Ω,F2))(∀E ∈  Ei i) φDS(P,E)={p|2(·|E)|p ∈ P∗(E)}. (12)
A preference-theoretic foundation of this updating rule is given by Wang (2001). He
axiomatizes the preference relation represented by (9) with P being the core of some convex
probability capacity and φ being the FH rule and the DS rule (see Wang (2001) for details
including the concept of probability capacity).12
Both the FH rule and the DS rule satisfy the requirement we impose on updating rules,
(8).
Lemma 1. Assume that P = {p} for some p ∈ M(Ω,F2) such that (∀i) p(Ei × W)  =0 . Then,
(∀i) φFH(P,E i)=φDS(P,E i)={p|2(·|Ei)}.
Proof. For the FH rule, the claim is immediate from (11). For the DS rule, the claim is also
immediate from (12) and the fact that (∀i) P∗(Ei)={p}. ￿
This lemma shows that the both rules extend Bayes’ rule to the case where the prior is
not unique. Finally, it immediately follows from the definition that
(∀P)(∀i) φDS(P,E i) ⊆ φFH(P,E i).
That is, the “degree of (Knightian) uncertainty” in the posteriors implied by the DS rule is no
more than that implied by the FH rule.
11The Dempster-Shafer rule is originally proposed as an updating rule for a non-additive measure (Dempster, 1967,
1968; Shafer, 1976). Later, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) showed that this rule is identical to the maximum-likelihood
updating rule, which we extend to the case of a more general in the text.
12For a related work which provides some axiomatic foundation to the DS rule, see Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993).14
5. The ε-contamination and Dilation of Uncertainty
In this section, we consider the case where the decision-maker’s Knightian uncertainty,
P, is specified by ε-contamination. We give a simple and easily verifiable condition under
which dilation takes place. Using this condition, we then show that if ε-contamination under
consideration is the one of a product of probability measures (as in the case of Section 2),
the decision-maker always experiences dilation of uncertainty, regardless of whether the updating
rule is FH or DS.
Formally, let p0 be a probability measure on (Ω,F2) such that (∀i) p0(Ei × W) > 0,
and let ε ∈ (0,1). We assume that the decision-maker’s P(⊆ M(Ω,F2)) is characterized by the





(1− ε)p0 + εq
￿ ￿ q ∈ M(Ω,F2)
￿
. (13)
In the following analysis, the one-period counterpart of the two-period ε-contamination
(13) turns out to be important. Applying the same idea to the one-period case, we define for







￿ q2 ∈ M(W,  Fj j)
￿
.
The following lemma shows that the second-period “restriction” of the ε-contamination
of p0 is the same as the ε-contamination of the second-period “restriction” of p0.I n a s e n s e ,
the “operator” of taking ε-contamination and the “operator” of taking second-period “restriction”
or marginal are interchangeable with respect to p0, which is a probability measure on (Ω,F2)





2, the (prior) second-period marginal Knightian uncertainty of the ε-
contamination of p0,i se q u a lt o
￿
p0|2
￿ε,t h eε-contamination of the (prior) second-period
marginal probability measure p0|2 = p0|2(·|W):
Lemma 2. Taking ristriction (or marginal), ·|2,a n dt a k i n gε-contamination, {·}
ε, are inter-


















2. Then, there exists p ∈
￿
p0￿ε such
that p2 = p(W ×· ).T h a t p ∈
￿
p0￿ε in turn implies that there exists q ∈ M(Ω,F2) such that












￿ε,l e tp2 ∈
￿
p0|2
￿ε. Then, there exists q2 ∈ M(W,  Fj j) such
that p2 =( 1− ε)p0|2 + εq2.L e t q1 ∈ M(W, Ei i) and let p =( 1− ε)p0 + ε(q1 × q2).T h e n ,
p ∈
￿




We now presents a result characterizing posterior second-period (marginal) Knightian
uncertainty derived by the two update rules in the case of ε-contamination.






























q1 ∈ M(W,  Ei i),
q2 ∈ M(W,  Fj j)
￿
.






























(1 − ε)p0|1(E)+εq(E × W)
p0|2(·|E)+
ε
(1− ε)p0|1(E)+εq(E × W)
q(E ×· )
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ q ∈ M(Ω,F2)
￿
,





since q1 × q2 ∈ M(Ω,F2).16





exists q ∈ M(Ω,F2) such that
p =
(1 − ε)p0|1(E)
(1 − ε)p0|1(E)+εq(E × W)
p0|2(·|E)+
ε
(1 − ε)p0|1(E)+εq(E × W)
q(E ×· )
by (15).W h e n q(E × W)=0 , it follows that p = p0|2(·|E), and hence, p ∈ R (let q1
be such that q1(E)=0in the definition of R). When q(E × W)  =0 ,l e tq1 = q|1 and
q2 = q|2(·|E), which is now well-defined, in the definition of R. Then, q1 ∈ M(W,  Ei i) and
q2 ∈ M(W,  Fj j), and hence, p ∈ R.T h u sw eh a v ep r o v e dt h a t(14) holds true.





which completes the proof in the case of the FH rule.




⊆ R (let q1 be such that q1(E)=1 ). To
show that the opposite inclusion also holds, let p ∈ R. Then, there exist q1 ∈ M(W,  Ei i) and








=( 1 − ε￿)p0|2(·|E)+ε￿ ￿





















the opposite inclusion holds by (a) and the fact that φDS ⊆ φFH always holds.





(1 − ε)p0 + εq
￿
￿ q ∈ M(Ω,F2) and q(E × W)=1
￿
,17































. Then, there exists q2 ∈ M(Ω, Fj j) such that p2 =( 1 −ε￿)p0|2(·|E)+ε￿q2.
Let q1 be the element of M(W, Ei i) such that q1(E)=1 . Then, q1 × q2 ∈ M(Ω,F2),





(c) To show ε￿ >ε . S i n c ew eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a t(∀i : i =1 ,...m) p0(Ei × W) > 0 and
m ≥ 2 in Section 3, it follows that (∀i : i =1 ,...m) p0(Ei × W)=p0|1(Ei) < 1. Therefore, it
holds that ε￿ >ε . ￿
Let us now define a measure of the “informational value” of the observation E with
respect to p0, the “pre-contamination” probability measure. Let E ∈  Ei i and let δ (E) ∈ [0,1]
be defined by
δ (E)= m a x
j=1,...,n
 
  p0|2(Fj|E) − p0|2(Fj)
 
  .
The real number δ (E) is the maximum of the “probability change” due to the observation E
with respect to the pre-contamination probability measure p0, which can be considered as a
measure of the informational value of the observation E for p0.
The next theorem shows that, if ε, the degree of contamination of p0, is sufficiently
large with respect to δ (E), the observation E’s information value with respect to p0, then the
dilation takes place.
Theorem 2. Let P be given by
 
p0 ε and let E ∈  Ei i. Suppose that the degree of contam-
ination of p0 is sufficiently large compared with the informational value of the observation E
with respect to p0, that is, suppose that the following inequality holds:
ε>
p0|1(E)
(1 − p0|1(E))minj p0|2(Fj)
δ (E) . (16)18



























where the inclusion is strict and ε￿ is as defined in Theorem 1.
Proof. Note that the first two equalities in the left hand side were established by Theorem 1
and the last equality in the right hand side was established by Lemma 2, and hence, the theorem
















￿ε . Let p2 ∈
￿
p0|2
￿ε. Then, there exists q2 ∈
M(W, Fj j) such that p2 =( 1− ε)p0|2 + εq2. Therefore, we have



















It immediately follows that µ is an (additive) signed measure such that µ(φ)=0and µ(W)=1 .












In the remaining of this subsection, we prove that µ ≥ 0.N o t e t h a t i f




ε￿ p0|2(F|E) ≥ 0,
then we have µ ≥ 0 since q2 ≥ 0. Therefore, it is sufficient to show the above relation.
















ε￿ p0|2(F|E) ≥ 0,
since δ (E)=m a x j
￿ ￿ p0|2(Fj|E) − p0|2(Fj)
￿ ￿ =0 and ε￿ ≥ ε.19

























































p0|2(Fj) − δ (E)p0|1(E)
￿
p0|1(E)




where the first equality holds by the definition of ε￿; the first inequality holds by the definition
of δ; the second inequality holds by the min operator; and the strict inequality holds by (16)
and the assumptions that δ(E) > 0 and p0|1(E) > 0. This completes the first half of the proof.












p2 (F) ≥ (1 − ε)p0|2(F)
=( 1 − ε￿)p0|2(F)+( ε￿ − ε)p0|2(F)
> (1 − ε￿)p0|2(F)
=( 1 − ε￿)p0|2(F|E)=ˆ p2(F),
where the strict inequality holds since ε￿ >ε (Theorem 1) and p0|2(F) > 0 by the assumption
of F, and its next equality holds since p0|2 (F)=p0|2(F|E) by the assumption that δ(E)=0 .















> (1− ε￿)p0|2(F|E)=ˆ p2(F)20
where the first inequality follows (17) and the second is implied by (18).C o n s e q u e n t l y , w e




This theorem shows that the dilation occurs when the degree of confidence in p0 is
small (i.e., ε is large) compared with the informational value of the observation with respect to
p0 (i.e., δ (E)).
An important special case is the one in which we have p0 = p0
1 ⊗ p0
2 for some p0
1 ∈
M(W, Ei i) and p0
2 ∈ M(W, Fj j),t h a ti s ,p0 is a product of two probability measures. An
example of this case is analyzed in Section 2. In this example, there is no informational value
in observation E with respect to p0. To see this, note that we have p0|2(Fj|E)=p0|2(Fj)=
p0
2(Fj) for all Fj. It is clear that we have δ (E)=0for all events E . Theorem 2 implies
the following corollary in this case.
Corollary 1. Suppose that p0 = p0
1⊗p0
2 for some p0
1 ∈ M(W,  Ei i) and p0
2 ∈ M(W, Fj j).A l s o ,
suppose that P is given by
￿





p0￿ε ,E i) ⊃ P|2, where the inclusion is strict.






This corollary shows a striking result. In the case of ε-contamination of a product
of probability measures, the FH rule and even DS rule, which are considered to have some
behavioral foundation and thus to be sensible in the multiple prior framework, actually increase,
rather than decrease, the degree of Knightian uncertainty. In a sense, new information worsens
the decision-maker’s confused state of confidence, rather than improves it.
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